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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9143
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000345

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DEPT FOR SA/INS
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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PINS](#) [MASS](#) [NP](#)
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL FALLON TELLS NEPAL ARMY U.S. ASSISTANCE
LINKED TO POLITICAL PROGRESS

REF: A. KATHMANDU 321

[1](#)B. 05 KATHMANDU 2956

Classified By: AMB James F. Moriarty, reasons 1.4 (b/d)

SUMMARY

[1](#)1. (C) On February 1, Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, stressed to the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Pyar Jung Thapa, that the U.S. military could not fully resume military assistance to Nepal absent movement toward representative government. General Thapa argued that the King was, in fact, making progress in his plan to restore democracy to Nepal in a timely fashion. Thapa highlighted RNA improvements in human rights. The Admiral expressed interest in the RNA's plans for winning the hearts and minds of Nepali citizens and efforts to capture senior Maoist political leadership. End Summary.

TRAINING AND LETHAL ASSISTANCE LINKED TO POLITICAL PROGRESS

[1](#)2. (C) In a February 1 meeting at the RNA, Admiral Fallon explained to COAS General Thapa that, while the U.S. military valued its close relations with the RNA, he would be unable to further assist the RNA with certain training or types of equipment until there was real progress toward representative government. Thapa conveyed his appreciation for U.S. military training programs as well as M-16 weapons. Thapa did not request further U.S. assistance in his meeting with Admiral Fallon, but a subsequent RNA briefing had a point highlighting the need for international assistance, "especially from the United States." The Admiral stressed to Thapa that the U.S. recognized the Maoist threat and would be prepared to offer additional training and assistance to the RNA as soon as there is credible movement toward a political dialogue between the King and the legitimate - non-Maoist - political forces. To make his point, the Admiral recalled his military service in Vietnam. He explained that while the U.S. military did not lose battles in Vietnam, the weak political process in South Vietnam ultimately contributed to

the collapse of the country, implying the political process in Nepal could collapse despite a strong army. Admiral Fallon concluded that there were many things the U.S. military wanted to do for Nepal, but could not, due to the current political impasse.

RNA SUPPORTS THE KING'S PLAN TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY

¶3. (C) General Thapa stressed that the King was working to restore democracy, as he had said he would on February 1, ¶2005. Thapa added that the RNA was supporting the "right side." He stated that HMGN's strategy was to "maintain long-term peace and stability under multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy." Thapa explained that invoking Article 127 of the Nepali Constitution was within the King's rights and was neither undemocratic nor unconstitutional. He noted that the King had fulfilled his promise to hold municipal elections within a year (scheduled for February 8), had cut his three year plan to restore democracy to two years and had made clear in his anniversary address to the nation (ref A) that elected bodies would be functioning by April ¶2007. Thapa opined that while party politics were not that important for municipal elections, they were very important for national elections. Thus, the King and the Parties would have to come together before national elections could be held. He added that once national elections occurred an elected government could decide what to do with the Maoists.

RNA EFFORTS MADE TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS

¶4. (C) Admiral Fallon reminded Thapa, who has studied in the U.S., of the strong commitment to human rights in the U.S. people. Thapa admitted that the RNA had made human rights

mistakes in the past, but stressed it had made improvements. He noted that the RNA had punished over 100 soldiers for human rights abuses, integrated human rights into its training programs, and created a human rights cell. In contrast, the Maoists continued their terror campaign and had recently gone against their promise to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) not to harm election candidates (ref B).

WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS; CAPTURING MAOIST LEADERS

¶5. (C) During an RNA operations briefing, the Admiral expressed interest in the RNA's plan to win the hearts and minds of the people. Explaining how the Sendero Luminoso movement in Peru had collapsed once its leaders were captured, Admiral Fallon expressed interest at what might happen if the RNA captured the top five leaders of the Maoists' political wing. Thapa opined that the Maoists would splinter into smaller factions if the government captured key leaders. The Admiral commented that smaller factions presumably would be easier to "wrap up" with military operations.

COMMENT

¶6. (C) While Admiral Fallon stressed that the U.S. urged a timely restoration of democracy in Nepal, General Thapa countered with support for the King's plan of restoring "democracy" through municipal and national elections by April ¶2007. However, COAS Thapa definitely appeared interested in resuming U.S. military assistance. As he prepared to board the plane, Admiral Fallon pulled Thapa aside and asked him personally to urge the King to show movement toward reconciliation with the political parties.

¶7. (U) Admiral Fallon cleared this cable.
MORIARTY